Abstract
This essay attempts to trace the casting and recasting of women’s position within the dynamics of separatism and Islamic resurgence in Muslim Mindanao. It hopes to demonstrate the remaking of Muslim women in Mindanao from ‘pedestal women’ to peacemakers from different periods in history. Given evolving conditions, it also endeavors to demonstrate the dynamism of gender in the political domain by looking at the role of women in the on-going peace process obtaining between separatist movement and the Government, as an emerging public sphere.
From ‘Pedestal Women’ to Peacemakers
Casting and recasting women’s position in Muslim Mindanao
Introduction
Although not in the least a Muslim majority country, the Philippines holds mainly to its southern part (Mindanao), a Muslim enclave that constitutes the largest minority group of about five percent of its total population. The influence of Islam to the Philippine Muslim society came by way of Malaysia hence its culture and traditions are more akin to its Malaysian and Indonesian neighbors than to the rest of the country’s predominantly Christian population (Angeles in Haddad & Esposito, 1998:209).
Notably however, “‘Muslim Mindanao’ has been the least served region in the Philippines since the 70s, with the highest poverty rates and the poorest human development indicators” (Rasul, 2009a). This marginalization is part and parcel of a centuries-old history of struggle, conquest and repression of the Muslims in the Philippines by a predominantly Christian society. Continual armed conflict has also aggravated this poverty (Abaño, 2007a) as the “war on terror” policy adopted by the Philippine government allowed it “to label the liberation fronts’ armed conflict as terrorism, and therefore fair game for counter-terrorism campaigns” (Rasul, 2009b).
The influx of Christian settlers in the Mindanao area which largely decimated the traditional homelands and political power of the Muslims was to become one of the main causes of social unrest in Mindanao (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:185). “The infamous ‘Moro wars’ date back to the seventeenth century when the Spanish colonial administration waged battles against the Muslims of Mindanao who refused to be Christianized, hence the designation of the present-day conflict in the southern Philippines as the ‘Moro question’” (ibid:186). The term ‘Moro’, which has been inextricably tied to Islam, is derived from ‘moor’, a pejorative used by the Spaniards to refer to inhabitants of North Africa and southern Spain which they also applied when they colonized the Philippines (ibid:188).
Separatist movements like the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf, among others, have turned around this originally intended pejorative of the “Moro” into a subversive and unifying symbol of resistance and cohesion -- Bangsa Moro (The Moro People). The common belief in Islam is a unifying factor for the three major groups from the different ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes, the Maguindanaons (the people of the flooded plains), the Maranaos (people living around the lake) and the Tausugs (people of the current), who have rallied the support of the Bangsa Moro in their struggle for self-determination (Alim, 1995).
Siapno opines that “the arena of society where the separatist movement and resurgence of Islam in Mindanao have had their most visible impact is that of gender relations” (1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:191). This visibility refers not only to the veil but also to how “Muslim women have been drawn into activities from which they have hitherto been barred by custom and tradition” (ibid). I follow Siapno’s question whether the ‘abnormal conditions’ related to the political insurgency in Mindanao that have catapulted women into a more publicly visible role has significantly contravened the traditional boundaries between Muslim women and men (ibid).
If we seek to understand the condition of women in a given Muslim society, “we have to see how Islam has been used to maintain their hold on power by different actors (state, political party, religious leaders, oppositional groups, etc)” (Shehada, 2009a) within specific historical and political conditions and how this has implications on gender roles. Thus, this essay attempts to trace the casting and recasting of women’s position within the dynamics of separatism and Islamic resurgence in Muslim Mindanao. It hopes to demonstrate the remaking of Muslim women in Mindanao from ‘pedestal women’ to peacemakers from different periods in history using insights from Abu-Lughod (1998) and Kandiyoti (1991). Given evolving conditions, it also endeavors to demonstrate the dynamism of gender in the political domain by looking at the role of women in the on-going peace process, obtaining between separatist movement and the Government, as an emerging public sphere using insights from Gole (1997).
The Separatist Movement and the Islamic Resurgence in Mindanao
The social unrest that besieged Muslim Mindanao in the 1970s coincided with a surging sense of Muslim identity among its populace. The Bangsa Moro, which have come to symbolized this “imagined community” that is an Islamic state were held together by an alliance of Muslim nationalists intent on gaining liberation from a national government which it sees as culpable of “land grabbing, military abuses, government oppression and neglect that have persisted for years” (Angeles in Haddad & Esposito, 1998:226). “To the nationalists of Mindanao, Islam came to serve as a symbol for transcending rivalries and reinforcing loyalties in order to foster the commonly aspired goal of national independence” (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:188).
But this alliance was built on precarious foundation “for not only did the Muslims belong to different ethno-linguistic groups and regions, but there were also chronic political and dynastic rivalries between leading families within the regions” (Majul, 1988:911). Thus, the alliance did not prosper and four separate factions emerged on the political scene: the MNLF which consists mostly of Tausugs and operates mainly in Sulu; the MILF composed mainly of Maguindanaoans of North Cotabato; the so-called MNLF Reformist group, active in Lanao provinces populated mainly by Maranaos; and the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organisation based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, supported mainly by the conservative royalty (mostly Maranaos) (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:188). Abu Sayyaf Group, a radical splinter group from the MNLF which seeks to Islamicize the Moro identity has more recently entered the political scene. Each faction has waged bitter campaigns against the others, thus reflecting not only the pervasiveness of the ethnic factor, but also undermining the very credibility of a legitimate separatist movement in their bid to become the ‘true representativeness’ of the aspirations of the Muslim Filipinos (ibid:189).
The seeds of Moro discontent were crystallized as the main legacy of the ‘Jabidah massacre’ in 1968 where about 30 young Muslim soldiers were summarily executed on the island of Corregidor following an alleged mutiny. “They formed part of a group of about 180 Muslims secretly recruited by the military authorities (with the knowledge if not instruction of President Ferdinand Marcos) in a secret operation called 'Jabidah' for training in jungle warfare, sabotage, and guerrilla tactics” (Majul, 1988:902). Investigation on the case was halted on grounds of national security and the media were asked to cooperate, thus, the matter was officially forgotten – but not by the Muslims (ibid). The incident fed the growing disgruntlement of Muslim nationalists which led to the subsequent formation of the MNLF and the MILF.
Hostilities in the Muslim Mindanao area started around 1971 “when leaders of Moro society published a manifesto demanding that the government take action to stop attacks on their community after a Christian-led para-military group, Ilagah, left 65 men, women and children, dead and mutilated at a mosque in Cotabato” (Abaño, 2007b). When the Philippine government answered, by declaring a Martial law, the MNLF launched a counter-offensive that marked its open declaration of a Moro secessionist movement (ibid). Since then, the area has been a battleground between government troops and the rest of the Muslim separatist factions wanting to establish their own Islamic state. “Over the last 10 years, the Philippine government has fully supported the war on terror, “internationalizing” the very local ethnic conflict in Mindanao, with allegations of collusion between al-Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiah and the Abu Sayyaf Group, accusing the MNLF and MILF for cooperating or coddling the terrorist elements” (Rasul, 2009c). By far, “over 10 million people have been affected by the conflict, and more than a million have been displaced from their homes as of 2003” (Abaño, 2007c).
Even with the semi-autonomy that have been granted by the Philippine government to the MNLF-controlled areas, some still expressed being discriminated and articulated discontent for not having any actual control over their resources. While they resented the presence of the military, including American soldiers and the fact that the government maintains a bigger budget for war in Mindanao instead of education, others also railed against their madrasahs being watched and targeted as terrorist schools if they are supported by Arab missionaries and relief agencies (ibid).
While Islam has played a cohesive role in the given historical events, it is perhaps simplistic to say that religion is at the root of all conflict in Mindanao as the dynamics of economic exploitation and political warlordism has also occupied a vital spot in these specific situations.
On the other hand, the resurgence of Islam in Mindanao has been attributed to three major interpretations (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:187). One interpretation is that Islam is utilized as a symbol of coherence by the factionalised separatist movement as displayed in the foregoing events. Two, that it is part of the larger international movement of Islamic resurgence which may be traced to the thousands of Muslim youths who availed themselves of scholarships to study in Egypt and returned with a deeper understanding of Islam and exposure to religious tendencies in the Muslim world (Majul, 1988:901). Many of them became part of a new and younger ulema; others who did not return to dedicate themselves fully to religious activity served in the offices of traditional leaders while more than a few of the scholars had studied in military and professional schools in Egypt (ibid). Also, more than a thousand Muslims would make the annual hajj to Mecca with some of them extending their journey to Muslim countries, especially Egypt and would return with a heightened religious fervour and loaded with Islamic literature for relatives and friends (ibid). Madrasahs and mosques flourished soon after, supported by Arab and Muslim non-Philippine teaching staff, with support coming from Muslim countries and international Muslim organizations (ibid). Three, the interpretation that it emerged as an alternative to, and a critique of, the demoralized leadership of the secular elite” (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:187). Muslim youth had greatly increased its political sophistication and would participate in student seminars and public demonstrations involving international issues (Majul, 1988:901). It would also become openly critical of its traditional leaders, especially those holding political offices, whom it charged with not doing enough for the cause of Islam and the social and economic uplifting of the Muslim community (ibid:902).
Militating against the typecast of a Muslim Woman
Whereas most literature ardently tackle the role of men in power positions, like the traditional elite and intellectuals and the ‘ulemas, within the dynamics of the separatist movement and the resurgence of Islam, little attention is given to the role of women (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:191). Yet, “women and Islam has also been a question implicated in the power struggle among political groups in any given Muslim society” (Shehada, 2009b). There is a double-edged typecasting of Muslim women as pedestal women, who occupies an important position in the lives of Muslim men, while being repressed, passive, and tagged as without initiative. This section tries to explore this typecasting by illustrating that the role of women in the separatist movement interspersed with changing values brought about by the Islamic resurgence has not been static, as they have been recruited into the traditional male arena that is politics and warfare. It also tries to address the earlier question whether the traditional boundaries between Muslim women and men have been breached as they actively take part in the struggle for liberation.
Muslim women in retrospect
A brief look back to discrete periods in Philippine history reveals the evolving position of women in Muslim society and provides a backdrop of the traditional roles that have boxed them through time. Philippine Muslim society prior to the coming of the Americans tells of “a very strong perception of rank and order, with commoners and slaves always tending to follow the datus and their families” (Angeles in Haddad & Esposito, 1998:210). “During this period, the Muslim women did not have the freedom to make choices for herself, especially in matters of education and marriage” (ibid). Women, for example, were married off to consolidate alliances among ruling families. There was much role differentiation on the basis of the distinction between the public and private space as women’s activities were centered in the home and women’s involvement in the decision-making process was largely confined to domestic affairs (ibid). Although there were some isolated practices, such as when women were able to get involved in politics or were able to conversely freely with men in public, these were mostly confined to upper-class women.
When the Americans gained control over the Muslim sultanate in 1899, attendant to their goal of “civilizing” the Muslims was the introduction of public health and mass education in the Muslim areas (ibid:212). Although received with much resistance at first, Angeles (in Haddad & Esposito, 1998:212-213) narrates that girls’ education indicated the objective of enhancing the domestic roles of women, saved for a school that was opened in Jolo for daughters of royal families in order to prepare women for leadership in their own communities and be role models and leaders of the people. Even then, the practice of arranged marriage continued during this period with the bride accepting the arrangement out of a sense of duty and family honor (ibid). But the larger goal of the American civilizing project was to make Muslims be like other Filipinos for political and economic expediency and women were to be instruments in this undertaking (ibid).
During the period of independence, government policy was geared towards integration of the Muslims into mainstream Filipino society. Education was still the potent tool for integration and pacification with the establishment of universities as a venue for cultural exposure between Muslims and Christians. Again, most of those who were able to access higher education were men and women from the aristocracy. It was also during this time that the Code of Muslim Personal Laws was promulgated as part of the laws of the country which provides that in case of conflict between the general laws of the Philippines and the Muslim Code, the provisions of the latter shall prevail. The applicability of the Code in the Muslim areas covered subjects like marriage, divorce, inheritance, and guardianship of persons but this did not guarantee favorable provisions for women (ibid:217).
The increasing visibility of Muslim women in the public sphere saw them joining ‘women’s associations’ and ‘women’s movements’ but which again was confined to upper- to middle-class women. Also, although argued by GABRIELA and the MNLF, Amina Rasul-Bernardo of the MPBWAP states that the liberating influence which urban women enjoy does not exist in the rural areas. Various types of Muslim women’s organizations that took part in the Muslim women’s movement also flourished during this period. They were described as having diverse characteristics which include, a) those that are encouraged by the government and are included in the National Council of Women of the Philippines; b) those that are concerned with promoting Islamic views on women; c) those that try to combine activities for women with promotion of Islam; and d) those that are concerned with national liberation (Angeles in Haddad & Esposito, 1998:222).
Muslim women and the separatist movement
It is important to note here that while all factions of the separatist movement use Islam as a symbol of cohesion, women however, tend to experience Islam differently according to their class origin, age group, locale such as whether they live in an urban or a rural setting, and more importantly the extent to which they are involved in the armed struggle (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:198). These intersections in turn have a bearing on women’s participation in the separatist movement.
The MNLF women who refer to themselves as Bangsa Moro women, for example, came from various backgrounds. There are those who descended from the old aristocracy, from political families, from middle class families, and from the rural masses, women with college and graduate school education or women who never went to school at all, and represented various ethnolinguistic groups such as the Maranaos, Tausugs and Magindanaoans (Angeles in Haddad & Esposito, 1998:223). The cause of the movement was not unknown to these women as they themselves seek justice amidst government and military oppression. Although it was traditionally perceived as a man’s role and it was unthinkable for a Muslim woman to be a revolutionary, some families did not register any objection to their women joining the cause, despite the risks, because they already had some family members in the MNLF (ibid). Women’s involvement with the MNLF ranged from joining the men in the hills, to serving as communication links between the members in the hills and those in the cities, delivering medicine, supplies, food, messages and information to the forces, smuggling ammunitions and small arms using the multiple folds of their traditional skirts (malong), and engaging in income-producing activities to support the war efforts (ibid:224). In other instances, women were engaged in consciousness-raising among the Muslims as MNLF leadership has encouraged women to read the Qur’an and during ceasefire, women started to discuss women’s rights in Islam in meetings (ibid:225).
Thus women’s involvement has treaded between peaceful times and wartime. Luz Rimban (1998 in PCIJ, 1999:167) tells the story of Ling Gumander, an MILF woman who farms a 10-hectare land inherited from her father in Matanog, Maguindanao. “Nine months of the year, Gumander supervises hired hands who harvest corn and peanuts that she then sells to the nearest market while in the remaining three months, she heads the 1,000-strong army of women who call themselves the Bangsamoro Auxiliary Brigade, the women’s unit of the MILF” (ibid). In this MILF territory which has been carved as an Islamic state, men and women, young and old are trained to defend themselves in case the enemy attacks and the MILF mujahideen are away (ibid). But while women like Gumander are trained in warfare, they are barred from climbing up the ladder of political and military leadership and they are not permitted to fire their weapons unless attacked and as such will have to wait for orders from men (ibid:168). “Instead, they are assigned roles away from the battlefront: raising funds and collecting food, cooking, attending to medical needs, and overseeing the education of the combatants’ children in the village madaris, the Islamic schools where the Bangsamoro youth study the Qur’an” (ibid). Gumander believes that fighting in the holy war is a call of Islam and Remy Balitok, deputy commander of the women’s brigade thinks that helping in the jihad guarantees them paradise when they die. Thus the MILF women gave no complaints except for their attire, shapeless robes called abayas that are worn over loose-fitting pants and a black veil called hijab covering the hair and faces except for the eyes (ibid). While some women complain on the hot and cumbersome attire, others see it as protection from the lustful gazes of men (ibid).
As regards veiling however, it is a useful reminder that there is a nuanced interpretation of veiling in the case of Muslim women in Mindanao compared to other Muslim societies whose appurtenant meanings attached to the veil have been primarily linked to women being used as markers of cultural authenticity, a symbol of maintenance of convention, or a symbol of a conscious act of resistance to colonial rule. Other than being a recent phenomenon, the adoption of the veil by Muslim women in Mindanao is also relatively influenced by the extent women have been integrated into the international Islamic community, as such having been exposed for example to the Arab dress, or whether they have been educated (Siapno 1990 in El-solh & Mabro, 1994:194). As it is, Muslim women in southern Philippines who are older and more attuned to practicing folk Islam or relatively isolated from the dominant metropolitan culture largely because of lack of education and employment opportunities, are far more likely to wear the traditional malong than the veil (ibid:194-196). On the other hand, “accordingly, Muslim women in Mindanao see the veil as a physical boundary which separates them from the westernized Christians, and the immorality and materialism associated with the (Christian) North” (ibid).
Meanwhile, women affected by the armed conflict in Central Mindanao speak of a life between displacements, evacuation centers and atrocities (Inside Mindanao, 2008). Fatima, a 40-year old widow who lost her husband in crossfire and a mother of eight narrates her plight amidst the breakdown of peacetalks in the area (Baikong, 2009). She and her family had to leave their home in Cotabato and settled in an evacuation center. “As the military intensified their offensive attacks to the rebels in some villages in Pikit, Fatima had to carry alone the huge responsibility of protecting her children during the times of crisis” (ibid). Fatima is just one of the widows of war in Mindanao who despite her suffering remains strong in her faith in Allah. She narrates,
“Allah helped me to see and accept the realities. I realized that dwelling on it will not be helpful for my children. I have to give them hope. I have to teach them that life is short and we are here to become our best. We all aspire here, that one day, us and our children will wake up with peace and justice. We hope that the government and the MILF peace panels will resume and solve the problem in Mindanao so that we can start our life anew,” she added (ibid).
Peacekeeping: Muslim women’s engagement in the negotiating table
Women have played key roles in times of war and during the peace process. Women are not only ready to take up arms but also provide every available support they can give to the men in belligerent occasions. They also carry the burden of being primary breadwinners and carers of the family every time the sporadic peace talks between the leadership of the Philippine government and the separatist movements wavered and armed hostilities between the parties ensue. Thus, women have a significant stake in promoting peace as they are the frequent victims of poverty and conflict at the ground level. “Unfortunately, women are still kept away from the table when decisions that affect their lives are made” (Abaño, 2007d).
So far, peace negotiations have been exclusively conducted between men, usually shrouded in secrecy, even with women’s vital contributions and stake for the most elusive peace in the Bangsa Moro areas. But due to the pummeling effects of critical peace and security conditions, women could no longer leave the negotiations to the men. A group of women advocates organized an international dialogue in August 2007 “dubbed as the "International Women's Peace and Solidarity Mission in Basilan and Mindanao," which marked a significant and most visible step towards women’s involvement in the peace process. The dialogue, participated in by international delegates from the Asia-Pacific region, specifically New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines called for the enhancement of the role of women in the peace process and of the need to highlight women's roles in, but not limited to, health, education, and post-conflict reconstruction activities (ibid). It also pointed out the critical role of the media in easing tensions by truth-telling – that, instead of painting the images of war, the media community must help project what the people are doing in order to address the conflict situation (ibid).
Another noteworthy initiative is the All-Moro Women Conference on Peace Processes: Realities and Options, held in Cotabato City in December 2007 which urged the fast-tracking of the peace processes of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and highlighted the all-important questions of indigenous people’s right to self determination, unity across the liberation fronts, and women participation in the peace processes (Morales, 2007). In the conference, the Bangsa Moro women clamored for more participation at the planning and implementation in crises situations and in the peace processes, citing the U.N. resolutions mandating women participation in peace building and peaceful resolution of conflicts in all levels while suggesting to involve civil society and institutionalization of women solidarity and laws affecting women like the Muslim Code of Personal Law (ibid). The male-dominated peace process was also challenged by the women on the grounds that it has no clear policies regarding the advocacy, persecution, and pursuit of justice for problems such as human rights violations and killings over land, resources and hatred based on discrimination, no restitution of rights, and no programs for healing dialogues and culture of peace where life stories and anger are released (ibid).
Conclusion
By all means, we have negated the typecasting of Muslim women as repressed, passive, and without initiative by illustrating the various roles of women in the discrete periods of history, in the separatist movement, and increasingly in the emerging public of the peace process. But the historical embeddedness of the casting and recasting of the variety of positions/roles of Muslim women in Mindanao makes for a less categorical and straightforward answer to the ‘women question’ in Muslim Mindanao – particularly whether the traditional boundaries between Muslim women and men have been breached as they actively take part in the struggle for liberation. It has been shown that these spaces opened for women have been borne out of necessity – given, taken, and traded back and forth by men as the need arises during war and peacetime in the name of the Bangsa Moro; and not out of the enlightened conviction of the men of the inherent rights of women as their equal partners as women remain to be viewed as vulnerable thus needing their protection.
Muslim men have shown support for the increased participation of women in the public space as in politics particularly the peace process which has become a new battleship of the long standing Christian-Muslim schism in the Philippines. But the expanding space and roles of Muslim women in this emerging public sphere do not guarantee that traditional boundaries between the sexes have been overturned or improved. At best, these appear to materialize as moments of agency for Muslim women. Nevertheless for this reason, it can be said that Muslim women in Mindanao, by themselves, have been active participants in identity-making and border-demarcating.
However, such expansion of women’s roles from the private domain to the public also entail more responsibilities for women as they are now expected to become productive participants in the quest for peace in a platform traditionally reserved for men without necessarily expecting men on the other hand to do the same for the traditional reproductive roles of women stationed in the home. Even more so, women are faced with extending their caring capacities to the increasing number of casualties of war in their community while keeping intact a prescribed image of a proper Muslim woman.
Nonetheless, women have realized that their stake in the struggle for liberation must come hand in hand with a vision of transforming gender relations. Although the vision is far from realization, the initial steps taken by women within the dynamics of the peace process in Muslim Mindanao at the moment is gaining ground. But while the gendered nature of the peace process is revealed, a further challenge in accepting such notion as an emerging public for Muslim women lies in the issue whether it is rid of the old cobwebs of class and ethnic differences that have contributed to the messiness of the separatist movement in Muslim Mindanao.
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References
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Formed in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported by ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, split from the Moro National Liberation Front, advocating a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward the government. In January 1987, the MNLF signed an agreement relinquishing its goal of independence for Muslim regions and accepting the government's offer of autonomy. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the next largest faction, refused to accept the accord and initiated a brief offensive that ended in a truce later that month, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/milf.htm.
Means "Bearer of the Sword" or "Father of the Swordsman" in Arabic, operated in its earliest days as a faction of MNLF. But in 1991, a number of ASG members, led by Abubakar Janjalani, split off to pursue a more fundamentalist battle against the Philippine authorities. They deemed MNLF too moderate and conciliatory. Its goal was unambiguous: to establish an Islamic State in Mindanao, see http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/groupProfile.asp?grpid=6435.
The Philippine government recruited nearly 200 Tausug and Sama Muslims aged 18 to 30 from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi as a special military unit tasked to foment dissent among Sabah’s non-Malay ethnic groups, closely aligned ethnically and culturally with the Bangsamoro. The training turned mutinous when the recruits discovered that the plan would mean not only fighting their brother Muslims in Sabah, but also possibly killing their own Tausug and Sama relatives living there. Also, the recruits had already begun to feel disgruntled over the non-payment of the promised monthly stipend. As recounted by a sole survivor, the young Moro recruits were taken in batches of twelve to a remote airstrip where they were executed with machine-gun by their military handlers.
